מסקנות מחיפוש באינטרנט
הקרב בעין ג'אלוד, למרות חשיבותו המקומית, כנראה לא היה בעל חשיבות עקרונית למונגולים עצמם.
That the hope for Christian-Mongol cooperation against Islam was not unfounded was demonstrated when a large Mongol host under the Great Khan's brother, Hulagu, moved into Persia in 1256, destroying first the Assassin headquarters and then, in 1258, Baghdad itself. In the following year Hulagu's army moved into Syria, destroying Aleppo and taking Damascus as they went. In 1260 word came to the Mongol armies in Syria that the Great Khan was dead. Hulagu anticipated trouble over the succession and withdrew his forces from Syria to hold them ready for fighting in the East. The Egyptian Sultan, meanwhile, had been preparing to fight off the Mongol horde. When the Sultan's armies advanced into Syria, they found only a relatively small Mongol rear guard there. At Ain Jalud on September 2, 1260 the Sultan defeated this Mongol army decisively. The battle of Ain Jalud was of major importance, for it demonstrated both the prowess of the Egyptians and the vincibility of the Mongols. True, the Mongol force at Ain Jalud was comparatively small, but since no major Mongol forces were sent to Syria in the years immediately after the battle, Sultan Baibars was left free to attack the Latins in Palestine. The hope of joint Latin-Mongol cooperation in Palestine had failed.
(
עין חרוד) אם נצרף לכך את הדינמיקה המקורית של כיבושי הצבא המונגולי (
מונגולים-ויקיפדיה)
The Mongols were completely dependent on trade with the city-dwelling peoples. As nomads, they could not accumulate a surplus against bad times, or support artisans. The conquest began in 1200, because the kingdom that controlled northern China reduced trade with the Mongols. They attacked to survive. Conquest, in the Khan's initial viewpoint, did not consist of subordination of competing cultures to the nomadic way of life, but rather in their destruction. <sniped> However, Sorghaghtani Beki (see Philosophy of Empire, below) pointed out a previously unseen advantage to keeping the status quo. If the city-dwelling peoples were allowed to continue their way of life (strange as it may have seemed to the Khan), they could produce a surplus of food and goods, a portion of which could be paid to the Khan as taxes. <sniped> Genghis Khan in particular never had any intention of creating a world empire. Each of his conquests was started by a specific dispute over the developing trade network (the treatment of Mongols or Mongol merchants, or disadvantageous terms for trade). One such example is the capture of Yanjing (literally, the north capital, in Chinese) in 1215. He refused to exploit the capture of the capital of all of northern China, a real prize. After his success, he simply returned home to the steppe. The same pattern was repeated throughout the conquest of Western Asia, taken at a breakneck pace over only 6 years. It was a simple formula, conquer the resistance, establish advantageous trade terms, and return. The hidden benefit of this reluctance was to avoid the trap that all civilizations have made in trying to create a large empire on purpose. Simply put, rapid expansion leads to overextension of the empire, and an inability to protect outlying districts from invasion. Ancient Rome is a prime example of this problem.
(
מונגולים-ויקיפדיה) משתמע כי כיבוש לשם כיבוש לא היה בראש מעייניהם. כלומר שהסיבות לעצירת ההתקדמות במערב אינן קשורות להפסד ספציפי זה או אחר ב
עין חרוד. בוודאי לא של כוח משמר קטן יחסית.
In 1241 the Mongols were ready to invade Europe as well, having defeated the last European army at the Battle of Legnica. They returned home, however, to participate in the election of the next Khan.
(
אימפריה מונגולית) מוקדם יותר בשרשור נטען כי המונגולים סבלו באותה עת ממפלה צבאית באירופה. לפחות לפי ויקיפדיה (
אימפריה מונגולית וכן קישור שני) - הם ניצחו לפני שעזבו.
Europe was shocked at the news of two thorough defeats mere days apart. The Poles and others attributed the Mongols' success to supernatural agencies or suggested that the Mongols were not entirely human. In fact, there was nothing magical about them; the Mongols had simply exercised discipline, efficiency and order, three qualities generally lacking in European armies of the period. Almost as astonishing as the Mongols' invasion of Europe was their sudden disappearance. After its victory at Liegnitz, the northern army left Poland and never returned. Believing that they had inflicted such extensive casualties on the Mongols that they were unable to pursue their invasion, Poles still celebrate April 9 as a day on which they saved their country, and quite possibly Germany and Western Europe as well, from the ravages of the barbarian hordes from the East. The truth was that Kaidu and Baidar had no intention of venturing deeper into Europe--that had never been their objective. They had, in fact, carried out their assigned task brilliantly. With just two toumans totaling 20,000 horsemen, they had destroyed Boleslav's and Henry's armies and forced Wenceslas to withdraw his Bohemian host, thereby completely eliminating the northern threat to Batu and Subotai's army. Mission accomplished, they turned south to join the main force in Hungary, laying the Moravian countryside to waste in the process. As it developed, the Mongols did not remain long in Hungary, either. On December 11, 1241, Ogadei died in Asia. Upon learning of the great khan's death, Subotai reminded the three princes in his army of the law of succession as laid down by Genghis Khan: "After the death of the ruler all offspring of the house of Genghis Khan, wherever they might be, must return to Mongolia to take part in the election of the new khakan." Recalling all their forces, the Mongols started back to their Mongolian capital of Karakorum, postponing their invasion of central Europe for another time--a time that would never come.
(קישור שני, עמ' 6) כל האמור לעיל - מכוח קריאה במקורות אלו ונוספים באינטרנט, כמעט ללא ידע מוקדם. על עין ג'אלוד לא שמעתי לפני הדיון הנכחי. אם יש הערות ובעיקר תיקון טעויות - אודה.