כתבה קנדית על קריסת אורבנקורפ
בה מציגים את המיליונר הנהנתן ססקין מול זוגות צעירים קנדיים מסכנים שהלך להם הכסף לבית העתידי בטורונטו.
הם גם מספרים על הטמבלים הישראלים שהיו מוכנים לממן פרוייקטים בארה"ב וקנדה בתשואות בדיחה
לדבריהם אנחנו כ"כ טמבלים עד שרק אחד מהמשקיעים הפוטנציאלים בהנפקה בכלל טרח בכלל לגגל על הבעיות שיש לאורבנקורפ מול טריון
כל יתר הישראלים שמחו להשקיע כספי יתומים ואלמנות ישראלים במה שאף יתום או אלמנה קנדיים לא מוכנים
מסתבר שגם בטורונטו, ולא רק בחדרה, בונים מרפסות על הפנים
https://torontolife.com/city/life/anatomy-real-estate-disaster/
He decided to tap into a popular source of interim capital: the Israeli bond market, which had gained a significant presence in North American real estate financing during the economic collapse of 2008. By 2016, U.S. real estate companies had raised $2.4 billion (U.S.) from Israeli bondholders. For developers, Israeli bonds come at much lower interest rates than mezzanine debt, but they’re ridiculously complicated to engineer. To issue bonds in Israel, a developer has to submit to financial audits and write a complex prospectus that describes his assets and what he intends to do with the money. The principals of the company usually travel to Israel for what’s known as a roadshow, during which they meet with money managers and investors. Several of Urbancorp’s loans were coming due in 2016, and it was unlikely that the company would be able to build homes quickly enough to pay them off. Saskin would have seen the Israeli bonds as the only way to refinance his debt.
He created a new company whose sole purpose was to hold all the projects he was about to peddle to Israeli investors. The new corporate structure included most of Urbancorp’s pending developments but excluded three troubled east-end projects, whose presence may have raised red flags. Saskin also committed to inject $12 million into the company. The prospectus made no mention of Urbancorp’s escalating conflict with Tarion. “The investors in Israel never bothered to inquire what Urbancorp’s status was with Tarion,” says Howard Bogach, the watchdog’s CEO. “Had they inquired, we would have told them that there were concerns.” Saskin travelled to Israel for the roadshow and met with potential investors, with huge success. “Out of all the people we visited on our roadshow, only one had googled us,” an incredulous Saskin told a colleague upon his return.
On December 14, 2015, the newly reconstructed Urbancorp Inc. made its Israeli offering. The bonds were worth 180 million shekels, or about $64 million (Cdn.), and Israeli mutual funds gobbled them up. The money bought Saskin some badly needed time. Urbancorp received $58 million from the bond issue and used most of the funds to pay off existing loans. Saskin had managed to satisfy some of his Canadian lenders, but, in exchange, he’d invited an army of Israeli mutual fund managers and securities regulators into his business.
In late March, the bad news reached Israel. The bond market there had recently been rattled by a plunge in the price of Extell bonds over fears the New York luxury condo market was becoming oversupplied. Into this jittery environment, Urbancorp fired a bottle rocket: it finally disclosed its problems with Tarion, and Saskin admitted his initial failure to make the $12-million capital injection into his company that he’d committed to in Urbancorp’s prospectus.
The reaction was swift and furious. The value of Urbancorp’s bonds dropped by 53 per cent in a single day, and the Israeli lenders initiated a class-action lawsuit. They accused both Saskin and Urbancorp of breaching disclosure and reporting duties. When Urbancorp finally released its 2015 financial report, it projected a $15-million loss in the fourth quarter. The bond price immediately plunged again.
